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ABSTRACT
The psychological literature reveals a comorbidity between dissocia-
tive and obsessive-compulsive disorders. The exact nature ofthis rela-
tionship, however, remains unknown (Steinberg, 1993). This paper
offers one explanation by linking the manifestation of dissociative
and obsessive-compulsive symptoms to rigidity in the spontaneous
organiwtion and integration of cognitive/perceptual experience.
While the authors acknowledge there are most likely otherfactors con-
tributing to this complex relationship, they believe that the dissocia-
tive and obsessive's inability to attend to newfacts, respond to changes
in the environment, and assimilate/accommodate peripheral infor-
mation into pre-existing schemas about the selfand the world may
begin to explain some oftheir clinical overlap in perception, cogni-
tion, and behavior.
For over half a century, researchers and theorists have
speculated about the relationship between dissociative and
obsessive-eompulsive disorders (Davison, 1964; Shorvon,
1946; Steinberg, 1993; Torch, 1978). However, despite a grow-
ing body ofresearch linking the two (Bartlett & Drummond,
1990; Beere, 1996; Goff, Olin,Jenike, Baer, & Buttolph, 1992;
K1uft, 1993; Ross & Anderson, 1988), little has been written
to explain their clinical comorbidity. As a result, the follow-
ing questions remain unanswered: Why do dissociative indi-
viduals tend to exhibit obsessive-compulsive symptoms? Why
do some patients diagnosed with obsessive-eompulsive dis-
38
order tend to display elevated levels ofdissociativity? The fol-
lowing theoretical investigation of the psychological litera-
ture attempts to answer these complex and long-standing
questions.
Although there are demonstrated biological aspects of
OeD, initially hypothesized by Insel, Mueller, Alterman,
Linnoila, & Murphy (1985), associated with the response of
symptoms to serotonin reuptake inhibitors, biological con-
siderations are not pertinent to the current discus ion since
dissociative psychopathology is non-biological, being strong-
ly linked to an environmental history of trauma. Waller &
Ross (1997), for example, using taxometric methods, demon-
strated that pathological dissociativity is not genetic but envi-
ronmental.
The thesis of this paper is that the comorbidity between
dissociative and obsessive-eompulsive disorders can be linked
to rigidity in the organization and integration of cogni-
tive/perceptual experience. A review of the psychological
literature reveals that dissociative and obsessive-compulsive
individuals have trouble attending to new facts, responding
to changes in the environment, and assimilating/accom-
modating peripheral information into pre-existing schemas
about the self and the world.
Relative to the available literature, the authors focus on
a selected area of research, namely the cognitive and per-
ceptual processing of dissociative and obsessive-compulsive
individuals. This research, however, taps only one of a myr-
iad of theoretical perspectives on dissociative and obsessive-
compulsive disorders. The authors, therefore, acknowledge
that their thesis may not fully explain the relationship
between dissociative and obsessive-eompulsive disorders and
that there are most likely other factors contributing to this
complex relationship. This, however, is not to diminish the
importance of this thesis. In breaking new ground, this paper
is the first to examine the "exact nature" (Steinberg, 1993)
of the relationship between dissociative and obsessive-eom-
pulsive disorders. Despite some limitations, it raises several
theoretical considerations and numerous directions for
future research.
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THE OVERl.AP BEIWEEi'l DISSOClATIVE AI\'D
OBSESSrvE COMPULSrvE DISORDERS
The association betw'een dissoci:ltiw and obsessi\'e-com-
pulsi\'e disorders can be traced 10 mid-2Olh Century research.
Among Ihe earliesl im'estigalions reported in the literalure,
Shorvon (19-16) presented on a sample of palienlS diagnosed
wi.th depersonaliLation disorder 88% of whom exhibited
obsessive personalil\' trailS. Reporting on the manifestation
of depersonalization experiences among a group of se\'en
obsessi\'(~<ompulsh'e patients. Da\1.son (1964) suggested
that patients diagnosed w;th obsessional personalities seem
prone todepersonaJization in responscs to ~'chosocialstrcs-
sors. Torch (1978) suggested that -in nearly all cases ofdeper-
sonalization. it i.s the obsessional nature of the ~ndrome
which seems to prO\;de the drive and the sta};ng power to
the S)1ldrome- (p. 197). He argued for a \<iriant diagnosis
called ·intellectual obsessive depersonalization S)Tldrome.-
Found mostlv among indi\;duals who are highl}' intellectu-
al and who ha\'e a tendency to ruminate on tile intrinsic
meaning of things. such as philosophers and mathematicians.
this smdrome is ~compri.sed of a complcx and fuscinating
combination of alternating states of depersonalization and
obsessional self-5Crutin)'~ (p. 194),
:\lore recentl\'. Armstrong and Loev.·cnstein (1990)
found that the Rorschach responscs of 14 dissociati\'e-<lis-
ordered patients displayed features consistent with an obses-
sional personality style. The)' compared Ihis finding to tile
obsen<ttions ofGeleerd, Hacker, and Rapaport (1945), who
reponed thai compulsi\'e mechanisms -predominated in the
psychological testing profiles ofdissociating patienlS in their
small s:unple- (Armslrong & Loewenslein. 1990. p. 453).
Summarizing the findings from se\'eral epidemiological
imestigations of dissocialh'e identity disordered palients
(DID), !{Juft (1993) concluded that approximalelr a lhird of
those sampled exhibited obsessi\'e-compulsi\'e srmplOms.
Ross and Amlerson (1988) reponed that of the three obses-
si\'(~-compulsi\'edisordered (OCD) patients comprising lheir
inpatiem sample, two exhibitcd alter personalities while
under a sodium am}'t<tl inteniew. Explaining the comorbidity
between dissociative and obsessi\'e-compulsi\'e symploms.
Ross (1989) suggesled that ·obsessions might arise out ofdis-
sociated aspects of the psrche~ (p, 166).
In other research. Bartlett and Drummond (1990)
reported on a patient v.;th OCD who exhibited spnptoms of
derealization during exposure lTeatment. ThC}' proposed that
dissociative experiences rna}' ha\'e pre\'ented desensitization
in thi indi\1.duaJ. Examining the pl'C\<tlence of dissociati\'e
S\mptoms in as'lmpleof lOOOCD patients. Goffet aJ. (1992)
found that twent\' percent had ele\,.ued Dissociath'e
Experience Scale (DES) (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) scores.
ThC\ concluded that -dissociath-e S\mptoms may common-
h' coexist \\;th S\mptom.sof()(J)~(p. 3~),Complicating mat-
ters, howe\·er. thC} noted OCD rna)' mimic dissociation in
some patients. "csuhing in elcvated dissociation scores. in
other words. a false posili\'e or misdiagnosis.
OVERVIEW
While the abo\'e-melllioned findings point to an associ-
ation bt:tw'ccn dissociathe and obsessi\'e-compulsh'e disor-
ders. the exact nature of the relationship remains unex-
plained and has not been the focus of much inqui'1
(Steinberg. 1993). nlis paper auemplS to clarify the rela-
tionship between dissociati\-e and obsessi\'e-compulsh'e dis-
orders 1»' looking for a common etiological factor in tlle PS}-
chological Jitcl<tture. Using a pcrceptual-based theon' of
dissociation and a cogniti\'e information processing model
ofobsessi\'e-compulsi\'e S\mptomatology. the authors link the
mani festation ofdissociati\'e and obsessi\'e-compulsh'e S\mp-
toms to rigidilv in the organization and integration of cog-
niti\'e/perccptual experience.
The following discussion has been di\1.ded illlo three
parts. Part one rC\iC\\'s the research linking percepmal rigid-
in' and dissociativc S\mptomatology. Pan two rC\1.ews the
research linking cognitive rigid it)· and obsessi\'e-compulsi\'c
s)111ptom'llology. TIlese include symptoms associated \\ith
OCD and obsessive<ompulsive personalil)'disorder (OCPD).
Pan tluee sylllhesizes these findings and the link becomes
apparent.
Perreptual Rigidity a"d Dissociatirw S)'mptomatology
Recent research has found perceptual rigidity to playa
sibrnificant role in the dissociati\'e process (Beere. 1996; Becre
& Pica, 1995: Beere & PiCd, 1996; Bccrc, Pica, ~'!allrcr, &
Fuller, 1996; !kere, Repask)', & Pica. 1997; Pica, Beere, &
Repasky, 1996). Curious abolll the switching phenomena in
DID, Beere (1996) collected and phenomenologicall)'
reduced descriptions b), 16 DID patienlS of lhe experience
ofs\\itching from one alter to another. Not only did his anal-
yses re\'eal Ihal switching required that -an alter curremly
in control had a rigid self-conslitution" (defined b)' Beere
as self-concept), bill that -the more restricted the range of
an alter's allowable experience, the greater the likelihood
of switching to another alter- (p. 55). According to the
descriptions. s\\;tching resulted when the acti\<ttion of ego-
discrepant thoughts and feelings became so intolerdblc for
the alter in cOlHrol that he/she lost control of the body to
a new!)'cnergized (non~xecmi\'e)alter. As well, Fine (19 )
theorized about a cogniti\'e perceplual subslf'3te for disso-
ciati\'t~ disorders, positing a d}'Stunctional rigidity to sublend
the disorder. Assuming thrse findings are correct. one
might conclude thai thr treaunelll of DID might be facili-
tated br working V.;t11 the alters in \\<t}'S that promote flexi-
bilitr·
:\IO\ing from the investigation ofdissociative pathology
to the process of dissociation itself, there is funher suppon
for a dissociati\il)'/percepmaJ rigidity connection. Testing
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a biological predisposition to dissociate consistent with
Beere's (1995) perceptual theory, Beere and Pica (1995)
administered the DES (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) and two
adult measures of temperament, the Dimensions ofTemper-
ament Survey (DOTS-R) (Windle, 1989) and the Structure
of Temperament Questionnaire (STQ) (Rusalov, 1989) to
125 randomly selected undergraduate students. As expect-
ed and consistent ,,~th their notion that dissociativity derives
from a general unresponsiveness to contextual cues, they
found that high dissociators tended to perceive more rigid-
ly and respond less readily to changes in the environment
than low dissociators as measured by their responses on the
DOTS-R rigidity subscale. Examples of the DOTS-R rigidity
scale include the following: "It takes me a long time to adjust
to new schedules" (DOTS-R item 13) and "When things are
out of place, it takes me a long time to get used to it" (DOTS-
R item 44). That these findings have been replicated ~th a
second random sample adds further support for a dissocia-
tivity/perceptual rigidity connection (Beere et aI., 1997).
In other research, Beere and Pica (1996) found that high
dissociators tended to rate themselves as significandy more
rigid in their thinking than low dissociators (jl < .05).
Likewise, Pica, Beere, and Repasky (1996) found that, com-
pared to the TAT stories of low dissociators, the stories of
high dissociators were more concrete and more likely to cen-
ter on a common theme across cards (jl < .05). They were
also written from a perspective in which the writer did not
seem to take into consideration why the characters thought,
felt, or acted the way they did. Providing further support for
a dissociativity/perceptual rigidity link, Beere, Pica, Maurer,
and Fuller (1996) found that reversal rates of the Necker
cube were significandy lower (jl < .05) for high than low dis-
sociators. Furthermore, changes in peripheral stimuli (back-
ground) did not increase the rate of reversal for the high dis-
socia tors but did increase it significantly for the low
dissociators (jl < .05). These results are consistent ~th the
prior "results on temperament. In odler words, individuals
who dissociate tend to perceive rigidly (alter their percep-
tion less readily) and are less influenced by the context
(peripheral stimuli or background).
COGNITIVE RIGIDITY AND OBSESSIVE-
COMPULSIVE SYMPTOMATOLOGY
Like dissociative individuals, obsessive-compulsives have
trouble attending to new facts, responding to changes in their
environment, and assimilating/accommodating peripheral
information into pre-existing schemas about the self i'-nd the
world. Early support for this notion can be traced to the writ-
ings ofJanet (1903) and Shapiro (1965), each ofwhom asso-
ciated obsessive-compulsive symptoms to an inability to
attend to peripheral information. Janet (1903) described it
as an inability to integrate reality (see Reed, 1985), while
Shapiro (1965) described it as an "inability to attend to new
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facts or different points of view" (p. 25).
Over the last decade, Reed (1985, 1991) has written most
extensively on the cognitive processing of obsessive-com-
pulsives. His two books oudine a cognitive-deficit model of
OCD which the current authors extend to the cognitive expe-
rience ofOCPD as well. A problem with the literanu'e in gen-
eral, as well as the paper presented here, has been the blend-
ing of OCD and OCPD into a single group and overlooking
their differentiation. While the authors acknowledge the dis-
tinction between these disorders, they take the position dlat
the two may be associated ~th a similar style of perceptual
processing.
Reed (1985) proposes that to compensate for an impair-
ment in the spontaneous organization and integration of
peripheral information, the obsessive overstructures and
imposes rigidly defined limits and time markers. Spanning
four decades of research, he refers to a series of laboratory
studies which support his basic hypodlesis. What follows is
a brief review of this research.
The first study that Reed cites is Hamilton (1957), who
administered a series of cognitive flexibility tasks to a group
ofobsessive-compulsives, a group ofhystetics, a group ofanx-
iety patients, and a group of normal controls. The tasks
included the Rubin figure and the ecker cube, three series
of ambiguous dra,,~ngs, three tests of discrimination, and a
block sorting task in which subjects were instructed to divide
different blocks into categories based on features possessed
in common. As predicted, he found the obsessive-compul-
sive group performed more rigidly than the normal controls
on each of the measures (jl < .01). They also performed more
rigidly than the hysterics on the block-sorting task, dividing
the blocks into a larger number ofsmall categories (jl < .05).
Of interest to note is dlat, like high dissociators (Beere et
aI., 1996), the obsessives reported fewer reversals on the
ecker cube.
Citing his own research, Reed (1969a) administered a
cognitive flexibility task to a group of 25 OCD patients, 25
matched psychiaoic controls, and 25 matched normals. In
this study, subjects received a list of target nouns followed
by a group of five associated words and the word "none."
They were faced with the task of underlining those words
that were essential to the target noun, or the word "none,"
ifnone of the words were essential. Assuming that the obses-
sive-compulsive group should be more rigid in their think-
ing, it was hypothesized that dley should have more difficulty
generating alternatives to dle target noun. As predicted, the
OCD group accepted fewer alternatives as essential to the tar-
get noun than the matched controls (jl < .001).
Expanding on the work of Hamilton, Reed (1969b).
administered a series ofblock-sorting tasks to a group ofobses-
sive-compulsive patients, a group of non-obsessional psy-
chiaoic controls, and a group of normal matched controls.
Subjects were instructed to sort the blocks into families
accordinl;l" to features possessed in common. Consistent \vith
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Hamilton's (1957) findings, the obsessi\'e<ompulsive group
perfonned more rigidly, allocating fewer members to each
famih' and requiring more families (I! < .00(2).
More rtcentJ}'. Turner. N~man,and Faa (1983) found
that obsessn'e<ompulsive patientS ",.ere more likely than nor-
mal comrols 10 focus on a single dimension ....·hen asked to
rate the similarity ofa set of paired emotional adjectives, In
contr.lSt, normal controls were significantJy more likely to
rate on two or more dimensions, Persons and Foa (1984)
had a group ofobsessional and non-obsessional patients com-
plete a series ofcard-sorting tasks. On each card ....'as an obje<:t
or briefdescription. Subje<:ts were instructed to sort the cards
into different calegories based on the object or briefdescrip-
tion. Assuming the obsessionals should perceive more rigid-
ly Ihan Ihe non-obsessional controls, the authors hypothe-
sized they should fit fewer items per category and take a
significantJy longer time tocomplele the task. Both hypothe-
ses received significant supporL
Despite Ihese findings, Reed's cognitive model ofOCD
is nOl without its critics. Jakes (1996). for example, suggests
that it fails to explain the motivation behind obsessiw=<om-
pulsive beha\ior and misrepresents the role of anxiel)' in
obsessive<ompulsi\-e spnptomatology_ He goes on 10 argue
that the research presented b)' Reed is -at best Controver-
sial- (p. 134) and hints at problems ....'ith the diagnosis of the
experimental and control groups. Ultimatel)'. he concludes
that Reed's thcol}' ofOCD
appears to be most plausible when regarded
as partial explanation ofsome obsessional dif-
ficulties in particular those .....here one
observes the patient's h;ning problems struc-
Ulring some task and tending to perform it
in an ovcrsu'llctured manner...the best exam-
plcs...appear to be...instances involving con-
t.,mination fears and cleaning behavior (p.
135),
Linking DWociatiue and Obsessi~"'PlIlsiueDisorden
Apparent from the pre<:eding re'ie....' is that the cogni-
tive processes hrpothesized as underl}'ing obsessions and
compulsions (i.e., an inabilil)'to attend to new facts, respond
to changes in the emironment, and assimilate/accommo-
date peripheral infonnation into pre-existingschemas about
the self and the ....·orld) is similar to tJle perceptual process-
e underl)ing dissociation,
II is possible the difference among dissociative and obses-
~i'e-compulsiveS)mptomatology may relate to focused atten-
tion versus perception of peripher.1.1 stimuli, Rele\<1nt to
obsessi\'e-compulsive disorders, the literature presented
here addresses the rigid conceptual and perceptual focus-
ing on particular figures. By contrdSt, Ihe perceptual thea-
rv and research by Beere and Pica (1995) emphasizes a dis-
tinction belween focused attenlion and peripheral
perception. The)' corre1att.-d the latter ....'ith di.ssociati\;ly, In
this wa}'. e\'en though the dissociati\'e and obsessive<om-
pulsive person appear rigid, tJle source of the rigidil)' might
derive from t odifferent ....<1)'5 oforganizing perceptual expe-
rience. Follo ing this logic. some \<1riance bet.....een the t.....o
disorders .....ould be shared, but not completely.
Despite tJle apparent Q\·erlap. the authors belie\'C the
relationship among trauma. dissociation, obsessions. and
compulsions can be readil)'di.stinguished. For the most part,
dissociation occurs as a defensive reaction to a traumatic e\'ent
in the Ih'ed,world. Obsessions and compulsions. on the other
hand. occur as a way to keep anxiel)' pro"oking feelings from
entering conscious awareness. In thisw-dy, dissociation might
be construed as representing a rcsponse against something
extcrnal. while obsessions and compulsions represent a
response to something intemal most notably a thought or
bodily feeling.
Another interesting link comes from Beere's (1996)
research on sv.'itching. Based on his analysis of the .....ritten
descriptions and his c1inic-.l1 experience, Beere (1996) has
noticed that host personalities ....il1 experience obsessions
when alters insen their thoughts, impulses, emotions. or
memories into consciousness, InC\irabl)', the obsessions are
distressing, More 10 the point, the)' are inconsistent \\ith the
self-constimtion of the host. The host's inability to own
(accept, tolerate) the experience as -mine-leads 10 the dis-
tress. the acti\'e attempt to stop the experience, and the effon
to avoid it. The critical underl}ing feature of the self-con-
stitution is its rigidity or inabilil)' to nexibly incorporate n~'
ordifferenl experience. It would seem reasonable to hrpoth-
esize that a perceptually rigid way oforganiz.ing experience
probably underlies the ribrid self-constit.ution, Critical to note
is that the processjustdescribed isalmosl identicallo Reed's,
assimilaling/accommodating peripheral information into
pre-cxisling schemas about the self.
An inlereslingquestion pcrmins to the origin ofthe ligid·
it)'. The authors have so far considered the rigid perceplu-
al style 10 be biological, or lemper.lInental. Might there be
olher origins for this rigidity? Might. for example, a child
learn ';a modeling? Or might Ihe experience of trauma
-teach M a rigid perceplual style?
A final association between dissociative and obsessh'~
compulsh'e disorders might be deri\'ed by comparing the
defenses used by obsessive<ompulsh'es and the defensive
function ofdissociation. Three ps),chological defenses have
bttn associated ....ith obsessi\'e-compulsive s)mptomatology:
isolation, undoing, and reaction fonnation (Yar)'ur3-Tobias
& Neziroglu. 1983), From an anal)tical perspective, theobses-
si"e uses isolation to separate and repress anxiet)'-provoking
feelings (most often, feelings of angel" and resentmelll
to.....ard a significant other) from entering conscious a.....are-
ness, For the compuJsi\"e, the defense of undoing prevents
acting on id-related impulses (most often, feelings of anger
and resentment toward a significant other). Reaction for-
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mation, which works by engaging in patterns of behavior
which are exactly the opposite of the underlying impulses,
has been hypothesized to explain the obsessive's often
superficially cooperative nature. This masks underlying feel-
ings of anger, guilt, and self-degradation.
Of the three propo ed defenses, only isolation has
received empirical support (Rubino, Sonnino, & Tonini,
1992). Critical to note is the similarity between the function
that isolation serves for the obsessive-eompulsive and the
defensive function of dissociation. Both arise out of a need
to prevent anxiety-provoking emotions from entering con-
scious awareness. Goffet al. (1992) suggested that OCD might
mimic dissociation in some cases resulting in false diagnoses.
In some cases, might the obsessive's attempt to repress anx-
iety-provoking feelings from conscious awareness mimic dis-
sociation? ';"hile this might be the case for obsessives who
endorse dissociative symptoms during obsessions or com-
pulsions and not at any other time, tlle authors suggest that
it fails to explain the obsessive who dissociates independent
of tlle obsession or compulsion. Anotller interesting ques-
tion pertains to the relationship between dissociation and
repression. Is the obsessive's attempt to repress anxiety-pro-
voking affect a special form ofdissociation? Though beyond
the scope of this paper, this question raises various theoret-
ical implications about the relationship between dissociation
and repression. For a comprehensive re\~ewof this research
see Singer (1990).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The purpose of this paper was to clarify the relationship
between dissociative and obsessive-eompulsive disorders by
identifying a common etiological factor in the psychologi-
cal literature. Drawing on a perceptual model of dissocia-
tion and a cognitive model of obsessive-compulsive symp-
tomatology, the authors linked the comorbidity between
dissociative and obsessive-compulsive disorders to a rigidity
in the organization and integration of cognitive/perceptu-
al experience. Both dissociative and obsessive-eompulsive
individuals have trouble attending to new facts, responding
to changes in the environment, and assimilating/accom-
modating peripheral information into pre-existing schemas
about the self and tlle world. Directions for future research
might focus on the questions raised throughout the body of
this paper. It might also prove a useful clinical study to focus
on obsessions and compulsions in DID, OCD, and obsessive-
compulsive personality disorder in order to clarify their sim-
ilarity, difference, and theoretical relationship. I
Critical to note is tllat this theoretical link is not with-
out its limitations. For example, given this common hypoth-
esized-predisposition, the theory cannot explain why some
patients become dissociative and others become obsessive
or compulsive. This question migh t be addressed in future
research. In addition, the theory does not explain why some
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obsessive-compulsive patients do not exhibit dissociative
symptoms or why dissociative patients do not always experi-
ence obsessions or compulsions. This implies tllat there are
additional factors leading to dissociative and obsessive-com-
pulsive symptoms. Attempts to clarify these additional fac-
tors might clarify the "motivation"behind the rigidity, a con-
ceptual omission for whichJakes (1996) criticizes Reed (1985,
1991).
While the theory presented here begins to explain some
of the as ociation between dissociative and obsessive-eom-
pulsive disorders, it is important to make the following
caveats. First, tl1e autl10rs do not believe tl1at an inability to
attend to new facts, respond to changes in tl1e environment,
and incorporate peripheral information into pre-existing
schemas about the selfand the world fully explains tl1e asso-
ciation between dissociative and obsessive-eompulsive dis-
orders. There may indeed be otl1er factors contributing to
tl1is complex relationship. Second, tllat one perceives rigid-
ly, does not mean he/she \\~ll dissociate, obsess, or act com-
pulsively. There is most likely an environmental contribu-
tion, such as trauma in tl1e case ofdissociation or a restrictive,
demanding, and highly moralistic parental style in the case
of obsessions and compulsions; altl10ugh trauma has also
been associated with obsessive-compulsive disorders
(Rachman & Hodgson, 1980). Third, altl10ugh we have
emphasized a common perceptual/cognitive style, are tl1ere
differences in tl1at style unique to tl1e functioning of disso-
ciative and obsessive-compulsive individuals? •
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